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A Quiet Revolution in the
Administration of Justice
Peter H. Russell and Garry D. Watson*
On the 28th of October, 1976, the Attorney General of Ontario, Honourable Roy McMurty, released a White Paper on Courts Administration.
Compared with his Family Law proposals, the Courts Administration proposals have received but scant attention in the press (a press which in th~
past few years has written extensively on the inadequacies of court administration in the province). While proposals concerning family law perhaps
touch more immediate public interests, the new system of court administration set out in the White Paper could be at least as important in the long-run
as it portends a significant reform in our system of government.
The nub of the Courts Administration proposals is to transfer formal
responsibility for running the entire Ontario court system from the Attorney General's Department to a judicial council-a committee composed
entirely of judges with the Chief Justice of Ontario, the chairman. If and
when the proposal becomes law, the staff in the Ministry of the Attorney
General currently engaged in court administration will be transferred to a
newly established Office of Courts Administration headed by the Judicial
Council.
This proposal is an innovative solution to the Canadian version of a
difficulty in the working of liberal-democratic government which in modern times has become apparent throughout the English-speaking world.
The problem is how to arrange for the provision of an efficient adjudicative
service which is accountable for its efficiency to the public it serveswithout fatally undermining the independence of the judges who must deliver that service.
The problem has become apparent in recent years because the proliferation of laws and growth of litigation have produced much larger and
more complex judicial machinery. As a result, the high price of inefficient
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court administration-incessant delays and increasing costs of litigation to
individuals, corporations and government-has come to be felt much more
acutely. Witness the enormous spate of newspaper articles on delays and
backlogs in the courts.
In the late 1960's, the Ontario Government began to move on the
problem by centralizing financial responsibility for courts at the provincial
level, relieving local authorities of this fiscal burden. But the Provincial
Government soon found that its responsibility for the judicial system was
more nominal than real. The Government paid for the staff and the courtrooms but the judges remained in charge of the flow-or lack of flow-of
cases through each court. The Government had the responsibility but not
the control. The challenge was how to discharge this responsibility more
effectively without destroying judicial independence, a cherished and essential feature of liberal government.
Ontario, of course, was not alone in facing this challenge. The other
Canadian provinces, especially the larger and more urbanized onesQuebec and British Columbia-began in the 1970's to grapple with the
same problem. The Canadian situation requires an innovative response as
constitutional differences preclude the simple importation of American or
British solutions to the problem.
The clear principle of the separation of power in the constitution of the
United States has led to the judicial branch assuming basic responsibility
for court administration-at both the state and federal levels. Compared
with the American, the Canadian constitution is more oriented to parliamentary sovereignty and responsible government with all governmental activities responsible to the people through the legislature. In Britain in the
early 1970's, reform was achieved by placing a centralized system of court
administration under the Lord Chancellor. But the Lord Chancellor's position is unique to Great Britain and defies constitutional theory. The Lord
Chancellor, while a member of the Cabinet and the Legislature (The House
of Lords), is also a judge and, indeed, head of the British Judiciary. As
such, he is a figure who traditionally is seen as insulated from partisan politics. The same aura of independence does not attach to the position of Attorney-General or Justice Minister in Canadian governments.
In 1973, Ontario's Law Reform Commission came forward with a solution. Essentially this was a proposal for dual responsibility. A modern,
thoroughly professional system of court administration would be installed
under a Provincial director ultimately responsible to the Attorney-General
but working closely with the judges on a day-to-day basis. But excluded
from his decision-making authority would be those administrative matters
which are inextricably bound up with the adjudicative responsibilities of
judges. These would be left to the judges-and they included the crucial
functions of assigning cases to judges and judges to courtrooms. There was
112
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a reasonable basis for excluding these functions from control by the Executive. The Government, after all, is the most frequent litigant to appear as a
party before the courts. If its officials could decide which judges should
hear the cases in which the government is involved, judicial independence
in both appearance and reality could be seriously compromised.
The Ontario Government's first reaction, through the then Attorney
General, Dalton Bales, was to support the concept of an extensive new system of efficient court management but to insist that it must be an integral
part of the day to day operations of the Attorney General's Department.
This emphasis seemed to leave little room for judicial participation in court
administration. The reaction of the Province's bar and bench was predictably hostile. There were signs of a serious constitutional conflict in the
making. Ontario's senior judges, backed by the legal profession, felt that
judicial independence was imperilled. The Government seemed up against
a stone wall in its attempt to discharge its responsibility for providing a
more efficient judicial service.
Mr. McMurtry's proposal is a bold and imaginative attempt to break
this deadlock. It is based, in part, on the shortcomings identified in a recent
experiment with split responsibilities for court administration in the Hamilton (Central West) area. This experiment demonstrated that so long as
judges retain control over the assignment of cases, an executive-based
court administrative office, no matter how well versed in using all the instruments of modem management, cannot direct the most critical aspect of
court business-the flow of cases through the courts. So the lesson was
learned: a dual approach to court management doesn't work; a unified system was required. But under the scheme set out in the White Paper, unified
control is to be exercised not through Mr. McMurtry's Ministry, nor indeed through any other government department, but by a committee of six
judges-four of whom are appointed by the Federal Government. Government policy seems to have turned 180 degrees!
The transfer of responsibility from the Executive to the Judiciary is
not complete-as, indeed, it could not be in our system of government.
Most important, the chief administrative officer under the proposed system-the Director of Court Administration-is to be appointed by the Cabinet on the advice of the Attorney General, although he would report to the
Judicial Council and could be removed only upon a Judicial Council recommendation. The Government also retains control of an important group
of appointments to minor court offices which are perceived to have considerable patronage value (a dubious part of the proposal in view of the important administrative roles played by many such officers). The provincial auditor will inspect the court's accounts. The cabinet and legislature will be
kept informed by Council reports and an advisory committee established to
monitor the work of the Judicial Council. And, of course, legislative con113
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trol, including the power to dismantle the Judicial Council, remains with
the Legislative Assembly.
A key aspect of the new system is financial control. The annual budget for court expenditures will have to be approved by the legislature. But
for the first time judges, through the Judicial Council, will supervice the
preparation of estimates. These will be presented separately to the legislature, and (although the White Paper does not specify this) might be presented by the Chief Justice himself. If such a practice of judicial accountability to the legislature were to emerge, it would give the public a
knowledgeable account of the judiciary's resources and needs and yet not
jeopardize the public's right to an independent judiciary.
At first glance, it may seem strange for any government to be supporting proposals which appear to transfer responsibility to a body over which
it has little control. But actually, it may be very shrewd. For what the government has now is nominal responsibility without real power. What the
White Paper entails is a clear ascription of responsibility. The basic responsibility for running the courts, from the highest court in the Province to the
lowest, is to be ascribed to the judiciary.
If the proposal goes through, the ball will clearly be in the judiciary' s
court. The critical question which then arises is will the six senior judges
who are to constitute the Judicial Council be able any better than the Attorney General to manage the work of Ontario's judges? Assuming that a
more efficient system of managing the flow of court business and deploying court resources can be designed, will the Judicial Council be able to ensure that there is reasonable compliance by the judges with these plans?
The answer to this question depends on the extent to which the judges are
willing to put a sense of corporate responsibility ahead of their own desire
to run their own court in their own way. If each judge remains more or less
a master in his own house retaining not only the independence to decide the
cases which come before him as he sees fit (an independence which, of
course, he must retain) but also the independence to design his own administrative practices, his own adjournment policy, and his own standards for
dispatching business, the new system may end up forcing us to pay too
high a price for protecting judicial independence.
The opposite danger is also a possibility. The new system might impose too rigorous a system of central control so that judges are forced to
sacrifice their professional integrity in order to meet the rigid standards of
bureaucrats operating only nominally under judicial direction. However,
so long as judges are in charge, there is perhaps more danger of the system's being too insensitive to the needs of the public than to it being insufficiently sensitive to the concerns of judges.
There are grounds for being reasonably optimistic about the prospects
of this new approach to the reform of court administration. By placing the
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prime responsibility on the judges themselves it removes the threat of executive interference with the administration of justice and gives supervisory
control to those who should be best able to define reasonable standards of
performance in the delivery of adjudicative services. At the same time, it
leaves open channels of communication and final control, through which
the public can receive an accounting of judicial performance, and can, in
the end, insist on changes if that performance, despite increased resources,
continues to inflict unacceptable hardships on those who use the courts.
It is to be hoped that the new system, perhaps with some adjustments
and refinements, will be given a chance. If it is, the rest of Canada and
much of the common law world will watch closely this path-braking attempt to avoid a collision between the principle of judicial independence
and the public's need for a reasonably efficient judicial service.
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